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Failing States and Statebuilding 
Jutta Bakonyi 
 
In the 1990s, state failure and statebuilding entered the vocabulary of international policy, 
development and academic forums, and think tanks. Both concepts were discussed, 
researched and advanced in reports, journals, policies and strategy papers. They populated 
databases and matrices, initiated research projects, and culminated in the establishment of 
commissions, research centres, institutes and journals. With a combination of descriptive 
(failure) and prescriptive (building) features, these twin concepts are an example of the co-
operation between academia and policy.  
               While both concepts emerged in tandem, they were further developed through 
collaborative conceptual-theoretical and political practice, critique and reflection upon this 
practice (Bueger and Bethke 2014). They sparked scholarly works, guided a growing number 
of international interventions, and increasingly structured North-South relations. Recent 
statistics show that fragile states received 38% of overseas development assistance (OECD 
2014, 24). The first part of this chapter discusses the rise of these twin concepts. It 
differentiates with Carment et al. (2010) two generations of the state failure/statebuilding 
discourse, and outlines how they were embedded in broader political and socio-economic 
developments. The second part points to theoretical and conceptual implications and 
questions the empirical utility of the state failure concept. The third and last section provides 
an overview of the main critiques. While it uses Cox's (1981) differentiation of problem-
solving versus critical approaches, it also shows that the arguments of both camps often 
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overlap. The chapter concludes with a summary of the critique and provides a short outlook 
into the currently evolving third generation of the failure concept.  
Genealogy of State Failure and Statebuilding 
Failing states, fragile states, collapsing, disintegrating and weak states – these characteristics 
are frequently, and often interchangeably, used to describe the decay of the political, and 
subsequently social and economic order in a country, and to outline the implications this 
disruption has for international security. The concept gained prominence at the end of the 
Cold War. It was then embedded in a more general discussion on the future of the state in the 
context of globalisation (Strange 1995), and the debate on new wars (Kaldor 1999), which 
interpreted the increasing number of civil wars as an expression of a wider state crisis in the 
postcolonial world (also Gros 1996). An influential early volume (Zartman 1995), described 
state failure as a (increasingly violent) process that manifests itself in a downward spiral of 
institutional and societal disintegration. In the worst case, such as in Somalia, this can lead to 
the complete collapse of central authority, leaving behind deeply divided societies that are 
trapped in cycles of violence and humanitarian crisis.  
Two types of interventions were swiftly designed, one to prevent weak or failing 
states from collapsing, the other to deal with the unruly outcomes of state failure. Prevention 
measures were integrated into the good governance agenda that dominated international 
development in the 1990s and aimed at enhancing the capacity and performance of state 
institutions (Scott, 2007). Simultaneously, peacekeeping was expanded into peace-making 
and peace-enforcement, and an increasing number of military interventions, among them also 
humanitarian interventions, were deployed to deal with violent conflicts (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2006). Reflecting the dominant view that peace can only be achieved in democratic 
states with a functioning market-based economy, a view summarized as liberal peace 
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(Richmond and Franks 2011; Sabaratnam 2011), the new generation of peacekeeping 
interventions promoted both democratisation and the establishment of a market-based 
economy. Humanitarian interventions initially aimed at providing aid to starving populations, 
but their mandate was, such as for example in Somalia, soon expanded to include peace- and 
statebuilding. In some cases, these interventions even took over governmental and 
administrative functions, such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo or East Timor. 
The at best, modest success of the first generation of international interventions led to the 
insight that political and economic liberalisation can only work on the basis of solid 
institutional frameworks (Ghani and Lockhart 2008, esp. 152-153). The need to ‘establish, 
reform and strengthen state institutions where these have been seriously eroded or are 
missing’ (Rocha Menocal 2011, 1719) was by the end of the 1990s summarized as 
statebuilding. Peacebuilding was by then increasingly subsumed to statebuilding (Paris 2002; 
Call and Cousens 2008; Chandler 2010).  
The rise of interventionist approaches in the 1990s required a redefinition of state 
sovereignty, the dominant principle in international relations. This was enabled by the 
discursive shift from national or state security to human security, which placed the individual 
at the centre of security considerations (Booth 2007; Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006). The 
promotion of human security was followed by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which 
advocates the practical application of human security in the form of humanitarian 
interventions in failed states, that is states that are identified as either being too weak or 
unwilling to protect their own citizens (ICCS 2001). The blurring of boundaries and the 
reconfiguration of the political and legal (Teitel 2003), development and security fields at the 
end of the Cold War led to the closer alignment of foreign policy goals with development and 
humanitarian aid (Duffield 2001; Hettne 2010). This also laid the groundwork for the second 
generation of the state-failure debate and statebuilding practice. 
 5 
While the first generation of state failure theory and practice interpreted failure 
mainly as domestic problems, at worst with regional implications (Yannis 2002), the attacks 
of 9/11 changed this view. State failure was now (as reflected in this handbook) added to the 
list of global threats and brought to the forefront of international (security) politics. Failing 
states were denounced as ‘breeding grounds’ for international terrorism and were held 
responsible for unleashing dynamics that threatened international security, and with it the 
wealthy states in the global North. State failure soon subsumed a variety of risks and threats, 
ranging from terrorism and organised crime, human trafficking and large scale migration, to 
global economic threats, infectious diseases and other health hazards. They were even seen as 
endangering American values and morals (Weinstein et al. 2004, 9). The power of the state 
failure concept lies in its ability to connect these threats with a broad range of other problems, 
such as poverty, institutional inefficiency, economic decline or corruption. The second 
generation of the state failure debate thus links discourses that were previously separated in 
the differentiated domains of development, defence, international law or foreign policy, and 
embeds them, or, as critical authors would claim, subordinates them conceptually and 
operationally into a security framework (Duffield 2007).  
Guided by the assumption that only effective and capable states are able to promote 
development and to counter security challenges, statebuilding became a priority in 
international politics, and was used to deal with the variety of problems and failures that were 
discursively connected in the state failure framework (Scott 2007; Rocha Menocal 2011). 
This discursive convergence found its operational equivalent in 3-D (defence, diplomacy, 
development) or ‘whole government’ approaches to statebuilding. These approaches aimed at 
the integration of previously disparate military, humanitarian, development, legal and 
political actions and resources (Collinson et al. 2010). The term failure was now broadened to 
fragility (Collinson et al. 2010, 16-17; Manning and Trzeciak-Duval 2010) taking account of 
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the non-linear and gradual dynamics of state decay. State fragility implies different degrees 
of disintegration, while failure was left to characterise extreme cases of state collapse 
(Brinkerhoff 2007, 2-3). On the operational side, the term stabilisation gained prominence as 
an interventionist approach that offers more than mere peace-enforcement but falls short of 
wider statebuilding aims (Muggah 2014, 1). Several countries established specialised 
departments, offices or tasks forces to facilitate interdepartmental co-operation in their 
attempt to promote stability and statebuilding. The United Kingdom, for example, set up the 
tri-departmental Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit in 2004 (in 2007 renamed the Stabilisation 
Unit) comprising the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Department for International Development 
(DFID), and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Another example is provided by 
the United Nations’ establishment of a Peace Building Commission in 2005, which aims 
especially at enhancing cooperation between international and national state-builders. Other 
examples are the US Office on the Co-ordination for Reconstruction and Stabilisation 
(O/CRS)1, established in 2004, or the Canadian Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force 
(START) in 2005.  
With the shift from failure to fragility, the narrow understanding of states as an 
embodiment of authority or as a set of core institutions, was broadened to include state-
society relations (Brinkerhoff 2007, 4; Rocha Menocal 2011). The OECD (2013, 11), for 
example, identified states as fragile if they ‘lack the ability to develop mutually constructive 
relations with society and […] have a weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions’. 
Legitimacy received a central place in the second generation of state fragility/statebuilding 
debate, and the initial statebuilding focus on capacity and institution building was broadened, 
to include a wide range of activities that aimed at reshaping state-society relations. This was 
most prominently operationalised in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in 
Afghanistan. Beyond civil-military co-operation, the PRTs also used so called Quick Impact 
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Projects as means to build the legitimacy of the state by ‘providing immediately tangible 
benefits to the population - ‘quick wins’ - that underpin their confidence in the state and the 
political process that it represents’ (SU n.D, 11; see also Gordon 2014). The new 
statebuilding programmes, also promoted civil society engagement in statebuilding, and 
placed one focus on the ‘empowerment’ of citizens, here especially disadvantaged and 
minority groups. Civil society organisations and even citizens were expected to participate in 
the statebuilding exercise, and an increasing number of community-driven reconstruction 
initiatives were now designed to support the participation of citizens in the attempt to 
reconstruct institutions and to build states from the bottom up (Cliffe et al. 2003).  
The interdepartmental co-operation, the stepwise approach from peace enforcement to 
stabilization to statebuilding, and an increasing acknowledgement of local structures and 
actors further widened statebuilding practice. Interventions incorporated a broad number of 
activities combining security promotion with peace building and development, and including 
programmes as diverse as the promotion of democratisation, institution building, bureaucracy 
promotion, support of rule of law, human rights and political participation, economic 
development, poverty reduction and welfare provision etc. However, while the practices of 
these interventions might not have changed significantly, their integration into the 
statebuilding framework provided them with new meaning (Chandler 2010, 10).  
Defining Fragility: Which states are fragile, and what exactly is failing?  
The rise of the twin concepts of state failure/statebuilding is not matched by their conceptual 
coherence. A number of scholars have criticised the state failure/fragility concepts2 for their 
lack of conceptual clarity and failure to provide empirical evidence (Hill 2005; Hagmann and 
Hoehne 2009; Patrick 2007; Brinkerhoff 2014). The broad variety of terms – failure, fragility, 
decay, collapse, weakness – already indicates conceptual ambiguity and challenges further 
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theorising (Collinson et al. 2010, chap. 2). These labels have unclear or overlapping 
meanings, and are often used without specifying characteristics or criteria of failure or 
weakness (Scott 2007). However, a minimalist understanding of failure can be carved out 
from the bulk of the state failure literature. The majority of authors seem to agree on three 
core functions of a state, among them the provision of security, the promotion of welfare (or 
basic needs), and a minimal degree of legitimacy and acceptance by the population. 
Accordingly, a state fails if it is unable to fulfil these core functions, and failure thus has the 
three features of authority failure (security gap); service entitlements failure (capacity gap); 
and legitimacy failure (legitimacy gap) (Milliken and Krause 2002; Weinstein et al. 2004, 
14f; Stewart and Brown 2009; Ghani and Lockhart 2008). The Commission on Weak States 
and US National Security used such a minimalist understanding of failure, when it classified 
in 2004 around 50-60 countries as weak (Weinstein et al. 2004, 14).  
Even if this minimalist understanding is accepted, the challenge remains to 
empirically identify if the core functions are fulfilled and to measure the degree of failure. A 
broad range of categories and indicators have been developed over the years to identify 
failure and measure the degree of weakness. The most prominent of these are the Political 
Instability Task Force (PITF)3, and the Fund for Peace (FFP), which annually publish a 
Fragile States Index (until 2014 called Failed States Index). PITF provided a longitudinal 
assessment of state failure. With its intellectual roots in conflict studies, state failure was 
equated with chronic violence and civil conflict (Carment et al. 2010, 16) and failure 
identified in four violent phenomena: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, genocide/politicide4 
and adverse regime change. Every subcategory integrated a broad variety of empirical cases. 
Under regime change, for example, the PITF listed the (violent) victory of Fidel Castro in 
Cuba in 1959, the coup in Chile 1973 or the killing of Liberia’s president Samuel Doe in the 
war in Liberia in 1990. Similarly diverse phenomena were grouped together as ethnic or 
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revolutionary wars, among the latter, for example, the Islamic Revolution in Iran from 1978 
to 1979, the ‘revolutionary movement in China in 1989’ and the war in Tajikistan (1992-98) 
(SFTF 2002). If state failure, however, serves as catch-all category for different types of mass 
violence and crisis, its analytical value remains highly questionable.  
The FFP’s States Fragility Index relies on another, only partly overlapping set, of 12 
indicators, among them six indicators related to political, four to social and two to economic 
developments. They comprise, for example, state legitimacy, security, public services, the 
rise of factionalised elites, refugee movements, or economic decline. In its 2016 report, 71 
countries were identified as being at risk of failure, albeit to varying degrees. 32 countries 
received a high warning, 23 an alert, eight a high alert, and another eight a very high alert 
(http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/). Other attempts to analytically and empirically grasp failure 
include the OECD-DAC database and its yearly published state failure report. It identified for 
example 51 countries as fragile in 2014. In 2016, the UK’s Department for International 
Development provided a new list of 64 fragile countries and regions (DFID 2016). The DFID 
list draws its data from other indices, but sub-divides degrees of high fragility (17 countries), 
moderate fragility (19), and low fragility (18). It additionally identifies neighbouring high 
fragility states (10), taking account of the risk of spill-over effects. The differences in 
numbers, indicators, matrices, and typologies are symptomatic of the difficulty in defining 
failure and applying labels such as weak, fragile or failed to particular states (Putzel and Di 
John 2012). Above all, they challenge the empirical validity and the analytical usefulness of 
the failure concept and confirm a general lack of theorisation.  
The concept of failure/fragility nonetheless continues to guide statebuilding policies 
and to produce a wide set of prescriptions and interventions. Without a coherent conceptual 
basis, state failure runs the risk of being equated either with underdevelopment and poverty 
and/or with violence. While it is common sense that countries characterised by large-scale 
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violence or civil war have a governance problem, most low-income countries are also likely 
to have difficulties fulfilling the criteria of stability and can thus be characterised as fragile. A 
proper differentiation between fragile states and developing countries is missing (Putzel and 
Di John 2012). Patrick (2006) additionally criticized that many policymakers and some 
academics have taken the main assertion that state failure/fragility constitutes a major 
challenge for international security for granted, although little empirical evidence has been 
provided to underscore the connection and causal direction between weakness and security.  
Some authors argue that the conceptual ambiguity of failure makes it especially attractive for 
policymakers and practitioners (Patrick 2007; Brinkerhoff 2014). Ambiguous and 
oversimplified concepts allow practitioners to apply one-size-fits-all approaches to countries 
with quite heterogeneous characteristics and problems and policy makers to obfuscate their 
own political interests (Patrick 2007, 647). Such concepts additionally ‘reduce the burden of 
information processing for decision makers in global governance organisations’ (Brinkerhoff 
2014, 337). 
Lack of conceptual coherence, doubt about the analytical utility of the concept, 
problems of empirical identification of failure and measurement of fragility, are 
complemented by problems of causality and the separation of causes and effects of failure. 
Brinkerhoff proposed to consider fragility as a ‘wicked problem set’, contested in its 
definition, ill-formulated and inherently complex, and comprising ‘multiple 
interdependencies and causal connections’ (Brinkerhoff 2014, 334), as no matter which 
problems are identified, they ‘can be viewed as a nested symptom of another problem’ 
(Brinkerhoff 2014, 333). In spite of the discomfort with the state failure concept, it continues 
to guide a large number of joint donor initiatives, for example the New Deal for Engagement 
in Fragile States (2011), or the discussions around the post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals, in which fragility was identified as a major obstacle to reaching these goals. It often 
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seems that governments, international organisations, NGOs or think tanks develop their own 
‘shopping lists’ of failure, based more on prevailing ideologies or the will to intervene than 
on solid empirical (and preferably comparative) assessments. This, and the practice to export 
a particular model of the state has raised suspicion that statebuilding is just a new way of 
promoting Western hegemony. The next section will outline some of these concerns.  
Liberal Statebuilding in Crisis?  
Both the concept of state failure and the practice of statebuilding are under critique. Cox’s 
(1981) famous differentiation between problem-solving and critical approaches is applied in 
this section to differentiate between two strands of this critique. The observations of both 
strands overlap, but they provide different interpretations for the identified problems and 
often arrive at different conclusions. The problem-solving strand stems in large part from 
within the statebuilding circles, including applied academic and policy-relevant research. 
This strand accepts the main assumptions of state failure, but assesses shortcomings and 
reflects on lessons learnt in order to improve the identification of failure and the practice of 
statebuilding. The ‘critical strand’, in contrast, challenges the basic assumptions, especially 
the liberal peace framework in which statebuilding interventions are embedded. Critical 
authors emphasise the need to identify how knowledge production and statebuilding practice 
are embedded in relations of power, and to reveal the interests behind them. Critical 
approaches are highly sceptical of the benevolent rhetoric and criticise the search for 
technical solution to highly political problems.  
Applied studies focus on the practice of statebuilding and technicalities of the 
interventions. Their main critique is framed in terms of aid effectiveness, and they regularly 
emphasise the absence of harmonised approaches and co-ordination among the vast range of 
statebuilding actors, the failure to jointly sequence interventions and the tendency to prioritise 
 12 
particular aspects of peace or statebuilding (such as institution building) to the detriment of 
others (such as legitimacy). They also criticise that programmes are often not adapted to local 
conditions, and are dominated by international experts who do not engage in depth with local 
actors. Insufficient funding, different time-horizons of the donors, lack of long-term 
commitment and long-term planning, and limited flexibility due to bureaucratic hurdles, are 
also regularly criticised (Paris and Sisk 2009a; Paris 2009; Lockhart and Ghani 2009; Rubin 
2006; Manning and Trzeciak-Duval 2010; Carment et al. 2010, 156-157).  
This critique found resonance in policy circles and among major donor countries. It 
was aggregated into lessons learned, and codified in policy recommendations and guidelines, 
among them most prominently the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile 
States (OECD 2007), which were, in 2007, collectively adopted by the 30 OECD 
Development Assistance Countries (OECD-DAC). However, although considerable efforts of 
donors and international organisations to improve their practices were acknowledged, most of 
the targets were not met four years later when the OECD (2011) conducted a progress 
review. Harmonisation of policies was largely lacking, and information-sharing and co-
ordination could not be sustained over a longer time frame. While the OECD interprets this 
mainly as a technical and organisational problem, Paris (2009) argues that co-ordination 
failure is caused by conflicting objectives, values and ideals of the intervenors. Additionally, 
the long list of issues to be tackled and the complex agenda of statebuilding is difficult, if not 
impossible, to be translated into practice. It was therefore suggested to reduce the objectives 
of statebuilding and to adapt objectives to the degree of failure. In many cases, for example, 
good governance might work better if objectives were reduced to enable at least ‘good 
enough governance’ (Grindle 2007).  
Another critique addresses the difficulty to actually implement policies and 
agreements that are developed at a central state level, or in headquarters of international 
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organisations. Actors ‘on the ground’ have to deal with complex challenges on a daily basis, 
and their actions are often more shaped by the need to make fast decisions and to react to the 
ever-changing situation of conflict than by the implementation of a strategy developed in the 
main headquarters. Often, policy frames and statebuilding templates enter into conflict with 
local social rules and norms and the friction between them needs to be addressed by the state 
builders on the ground (Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Millar et al. 2013). While the ‘problem-
solving camp’ tries to improve communication and to speed-up (joint) operational responses, 
the ‘critical camp’ points to the fundamental problem of transferring ideas and models from 
one cultural context to another, a problem that social anthropology has elaborated as 
translation (Rottenburg 2009, esp. 99-103.).1 Translation involves active agents, 
intermediaries or brokers (Sally Engle 2006) who pick up a concept in one setting, strip it 
from its particular context, reinterpret it and place it in another setting where the model reacts 
with other, already available, repertoires of meaning. While passing through the long chain of 
international development, concepts thus necessarily change their meaning and the translation 
outcome usually differs significantly from its ‘original’. This observation stresses 
contingency and the emergent and unexpected outcome of social interactions (including 
discourses) and challenges the general ability to plan social transformations and thus to 
socially engineer societies and states. 
Among the regularly repeated critique that overlap between the ‘problem-solving’ and 
the ‘critical camp’ is the failure to contextualise programmes. Statebuilders, for example, 
continue to focus on central institution building instead of addressing state-society relations 
(OECD 2011). While the focus on state-society relations would require a deeper engagement 
with local actors, statebuilders prefer to apply conventional development frameworks to 
                                                
1  Rottenburg builds on Actor Network Theory and their identification of translation as major 
mechanism in forming and maintaining social networks (Callon and Latour 1981). 
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fragile states, and rely on blueprints without alignment to local conditions or ‘local 
ownership’ (OECD 2011). The bureaucratisation of development and the application of one-
size-fits-all designs are not restricted to statebuilding but constitute a long-established 
critique in development and peacebuilding. The ‘problem-solving camp’ interprets this 
mainly as a technical problem, caused by the failure to develop or use adequate analytical 
tools, and to establish monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. The ‘critical strand’, in 
contrast, interprets this failure as systemic, as part of the contradictions and dilemmas of 
external interventions that aim at bettering societies they do not – and often do not even try to 
– understand. In the centre of the critical approach is the acknowledgment of the social 
relations that structure statebuilding and the enormous power differentials between the 
intervenors and the intervened upon.  
               This power gap, among others, is displayed in the taken-for-granted framework of 
liberal peace. Instead of discussing the type of state to be built or strengthened, intervenors 
rely on an idealised and de-historicised version of the Western state, ignore the violent and 
disruptive trajectory of European statebuilding, and use their superior power position in the 
global political economy to impose this idealised model, including its implicit norms and 
values, on less powerful, peripheral countries (Paris 2002; Mallaby 2002; Marquette and 
Beswick 2011). The partnership and participatory rhetoric of the intervention is, in practice, 
often contrasted by the paternalistic and top-down behaviour of intervenors. They undermine 
locally driven peace- and statebuilding processes, and contribute to the bifurcation of social 
worlds, and the growing social distance and ‘frictions’ between the intervenor and intervened 
upon (Chopra 2000; Suhrke 2009; Autesserre 2010; Lemay-Hébert 2011).  
Another line of critique addresses the point that statebuilding does not really build 
states, but instead contributes to the establishment of a narrow circle of political authorities 
(Marquette and Beswick 2011). These elites are usually closely aligned to the donors, have 
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learned to juggle the jargon of international statebuilding and manipulate labels and buzz-
words (such as fragility, local ownership, participation), at the same time as using 
international resources to their own personal or political advantage (Heiduk 2014). Such 
forms of elite (and non-elite) capture and the fraudulent strategies and misuse of aid by local 
elites are identified by both camps. The ‘problem-solvers’ react by developing measures to 
enhance transparency and accountability of aid and to monitor its impact more tightly. The 
‘critical camp’, instead, interprets these strategies as a result of the power relations that 
structure international interventions. Accordingly, development has created, and is placed in, 
a dual structure of power, in which the local side has become increasingly invisible for the 
external intervenor. Reflecting on their dependent position as aid receivers, southern actors 
have developed a broad repertoire of ‘strategies of extraversion’ (Bayart 2009), that is 
practices intended to create and to capture ‘a rent generated by dependency’ (Bayart 2000, 
222).  
The dual power structure also leads to the rise of local gatekeepers and intermediaries 
– in the case of statebuilding, the new state elites – who operate in the realm between the 
external donor and local receiver of aid, and use this in-between position to manipulate, 
direct and consume external resources and contacts. While this is characteristic of all external 
interventions, external statebuilding tends towards the erection of ‘phantom states’ (Chandler 
2006, 192ff.), that is states that have lost any linkages to their population, but merely exist as 
nodes for external intervenors. Actors behind the façade of formal statehood (including 
‘phantom elites’), however, continue to define their own rules and order societies in a way 
that remains largely hidden from the external intervenors.  
It is thus not a lack of local ownership – to use one of the contemporary buzz-words 
of international development – but the failure of the intervenors to understand how exactly 
locals own the statebuilding process. The (hidden) adaptation of intervention practices to 
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local social rules, values and world views can be interpreted as re-appropriation of the state 
by local actors, as local resistance against external impositions, as frictions5 between external 
and local actors, or simply (as problem-solvers tend to do) as misappropriation and diversion 
of international resources. The problem, however, remains. Externally built states often lack 
anchorage in their societies and fail to generate legitimacy.  
Already the guiding assumptions that state weakness is accompanied by social disorder, that 
fragility equals weak governance, and that failure leads to social chaos are problematic. 
Several authors have shown that societies with weak formal state institutions tend to rely on 
strong informal networks and institutions and do not necessarily lack leadership but are 
characterised by a variety of social orders and forms of political authority (Reno 2000; 
Bakonyi and Stuvoy 2005; chapters in Bøås and Dunn 2007). The ignorance of these actors 
and institutions was labelled as a main ‘failure of the state failure debate’ (Hagmann and 
Hoehne 2009). Post-development studies have shown that such failures are not accidental but 
part of the Euro-centric imagination of the post-colonial world. Embedded in the 
modernization ideology, post-colonial societies or states are conceptualised as transitional or 
incomplete, and can only be described negatively in terms of deficits, deficiencies and 
failures, that is by what they are not (developed for example) or what they do not have 
(functioning or strong states) (Chakrabarty 2000, 30-37; Hill 2005). Scholars even lack the 
vocabulary to analyse and comprehend what post-colonial societies actually are and how they 
function. In the tradition of Michel Foucault (1980) who emphasised the nexus of knowledge 
and power, post-development studies interpret the identification of deficits in form of under-
development, weak statehood, or fragility as a technique of power that links knowledge with 
interventions (Escobar 1995). The mapping of fragile states thus produces them as objects to 
be intervened upon in a specific way, through peace-enforcement, stabilization and 
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statebuilding, and this has given rise to a previously unknown ‘level of intrusion and degree 
of social engineering’ (Duffield 2002, 1052). 
This critique links to another question of whether liberal peace is indeed suitable for 
societies with different political, cultural, and religious heritages (Samuels and von Einsiedel 
2003; Paris and Sisk 2009b, 305-306). While parts of the problem-solving as well as ‘critical 
camp’ request in-depth, better and more serious engagement with local actors, one part of the 
‘critical camp’ challenges exactly the ‘moral framing of difference’ and the consolidation of 
‘them’ versus ‘us’ dichotomies (Duffield 2002, 1050) that underlies these requests. The 
search for the local maintains an ‘ontology of Otherness’ (Sabaratnam 2011), now displayed 
as difference between the liberal (western) and non-liberal (post-colonial) subject, and 
justifies the subjection of the latter to betterment through capacity building and 
empowerment (Chandler 2010). These interventions may be framed as attempts to save, 
develop or secure the (illiberal, non-rational, non-enlightened) ‘Other’, but they mainly 
legitimise external regulatory control. According to Duffield (2010) the main aim of these 
new interventionist frameworks is to police and contain informal and undocumented 
migration. Rather than overcoming poverty, these interventions are erecting new barriers that 
entrench the North-South divide, cement global structures of power and support the 
hegemony of the global North. This hegemony, however, is exercised as denial of power and 
interest and instead reframed as a therapeutic attempt towards empowerment and capacity 
building (Chandler 2006) and executed as administrative-technical tasks to ensure 
institutional efficiency, transparency and, above all, equity and participation.  
Conclusion  
This chapter traced the rise of the twin concepts of state failure and statebuilding, which were 
promoted by and further evolved in the co-operation between academia and policy. Although 
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state failure is conceptually weak and built on shaky empirical foundations, it initiated a 
seemingly ever-increasing number of statebuilding initiatives. State failure (later fragility) 
connected debates and discourses that were previously divided into the fields of development, 
international politics, defence or law, and embedded them into a security framework. This 
had far-reaching practical consequences for the global South. An increasing number of 
military interventions aimed at stabilizing and rebuilding failed states, with ever-broadening 
goals, ranging from the promotion of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and civil society, 
to poverty reduction, security provision and institution building.  
                This chapter has also provided an overview of the main critique. While the 
‘problem-solving camp’ aims to improve the identification of failure as well as the practice of 
statebuilding, critical approaches interpret statebuilding as a new form of global power 
politics. Increasingly, however, the ‘problem-solving camp’ seems to share doubts that social 
engineering is at all possible, emphasising the complex nature of interventions and their 
manifold uncontrollable and unintended consequences. This insight gave rise to the third 
generation of failure debate, which no longer focuses on states or state-society relations, and 
is also no longer confined to developing countries. Instead, it defines fragility as 
multidimensional, and characterized by ‘accumulation and combination of risks combined 
with insufficient capacity by the state, system and/or communities to manage it, absorb it or 
mitigate its consequences’ (OECD 2016, 6). Instead of producing lists of fragile states and 
designing programmes to re-build them, the new approach aims at enhancing resilience, and 
thus at strengthening the ability of states, societies, and people to cope with danger (World 
Bank 2013). The fragility/resilience approach is already interpreted as a new and post-liberal 
form of governing complexity. The debate if resilience has the potential to move beyond 
modernist binaries and statist approaches, or if it is mainly a more sophisticated form of neo-
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Endnotes: 
 
1 This Office was in 2011 integrated into the US State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and 
Stabilization Operations.  
2 For simplicity, the chapter sticks to the term failure, albeit fragility became more prominent 
in the 2000s. Up to date, however, multiple terms with overlapping meanings circulate in 
academia and policy.  
3 Previously called the State Failure Task Force (SFTF).  
4 Genocide/Politicide is defined in the SFTF report as ‘sustained policies […] that result in the deaths 
of a substantial portion of a communal or political group’. In genocides groups are victimized on basis 
of ‘their communal (that is, ethnolinguistic or religious) characteristics’, while in ‘politicides, victims 
are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime or dominant groups.’ (SFTF 
2002, 3-4).  
5 The metaphor of frictions was used by Tsing (2005) to explore the complex and global 
social interactions in the rain forests of Indonesia.   
 
